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Abstract
In this article I examine how the network externalities of communi-
cations activities and trading opportunities interact to determine the
structure of comparative advantage. These interactions are examined
by constructing a two-country, three-sector model of trade involving
a country-speciﬁc communications network sector. The role of the
connectivity of network providers, which allows users of a network to
communicate with users of another network, is also explored. (JEL
Classiﬁcation: D43, F12, L13)
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1 Introduction
The rapidly growing connectivity of individuals and organizations achieved
through improved communications networks (e.g., the Internet, mobile tele-
phone networks, and satellite communications systems) has allowed a conse-
quent increase in the ﬂow of business transactions. These networks are of-
ten characterized by the existence of strong network externalities: the more
people who use them, the more useful they are to any individual user. Ac-
cordingly, sophisticated and well-connected country-speciﬁc networks have
become recognized as the ‘competitive weapons’ with which battles for com-
parative advantage are won. In his recent bestselling book, The World Is
Flat, Thomas Friedman argues as follows:
... information technologies are important not only because
they are big global businesses in and of themselves, but also
because they are critical to advancing productivity and innova-
tion.... The more you connect an educated population to the ﬂat
world platform in an easy and aﬀordable way, the more things
they can automate, and therefore the more time and energy they
have to innovate.... (Friedman, 2006, p. 350)
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Friedman also highlights the importance of producers in knowledge-based,
high-tech industries, such as the consulting, ﬁnancial services, software and
marketing industries.
The seminal contribution on the role of network externalities is by Katz
and Shapiro (1985), who analyzed oligopolistic competition between providers
of network services.1 However, as their model is based on a closed market
for a consumption good, the role of network externalities as a determinant of
trade patterns is downplayed in the analysis. Since such eﬀects are often ob-
served in the world economy, it seems important to explore the relationship
between network externalities and trading opportunities in the open economy
setting.
As its primary contribution, this study examines how the network ex-
ternalities of communications activities and trading opportunities interact
to determine the trade patterns between countries. I also emphasize an
important concept related to network externalities –interconnectivity–which
allows users of a network to communicate with users of other networks.2
1 See Katz and Shapiro (1994) and Roson (2002) for surveys of the relevant literature.
2 Cremer et al. (2000) explores the role of interconnectivity between Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) in the closed-economy setting. Yano and Dei (2006) explores the impact of
the introduction of a new product which is accompanied by network externalities. Kikuchi
4
For these purposes I construct a two-country, three-sector model of trade
with country-speciﬁc communications networks. It will be shown that the
good that requires network services is exported by the country with intercon-
nected networks. The main result of the current study, which captures the
importance of interconnectivity of networks as a determinant of comparative
advantage, has not appeared in the existing literature on trade theory under
increasing returns, which only emphasizes the size of countries.
The structure of this paper is as follows: In the next section I present the
basic model. The nature of the trading equilibrium is considered in Section
3. Section 4 explores several directions in which the model could be extended
and Section 5 oﬀers concluding remarks.
2 The Model
Consider a world economy consisting of two countries, Home and Foreign.
There are two goods: a primary commodity which is produced only by la-
bor and a knowledge-based, high-tech product which is produced with both
(2003) explores the role of interconnectivity using a monopolistically competitive trade
model. However, that article oﬀers little insight into the role of network externalities as a
determinant of comparative advantage, which is the main focus of this note.
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human capital and communications services. Communications services are
assumed to be provided by country-speciﬁc network service providers. The n
identical providers in each country are Cournot competitors. Providers are
indexed by label i (i = 1, ..., n). Let xi denote the size of the i-th provider
(i.e., the number of subscribers), yi denote the size of the network with which
the i-th provider is associated, and z denote (z =
∑n
i=1 xi) the total number
of network users. For example, when provider 1 and provider 2 are intercon-
nected, y1 = y2 = x1 + x2.
Let the high-tech product be the numeraire and p indicate the relative
price of the primary good. The primary good is produced under constant
returns technology; units are chosen such that its unit input coeﬃcient is
unity.
Each country is populated by a continuum of workers with population
L. Each worker is endowed with one unit of labor and some level of human
capital for the production of the high-tech product, which is measured by
index r. The values of r are uniformly distributed over the interval [0, L].
Each worker’s productivity is also aﬀected by the level of network external-
ities, vyei , where v (v ≤ 1) is a valuation parameter and yei is the worker’s
expectation of the size of the (i-th) network. The v term captures gains
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through increased information ﬂow between individuals: if more workers join
the network, each worker can collect information more eﬃciently. It is sim-
ply assumed that a type-r worker can produce r+ vyei units of the high-tech
product.
Workers have the choice of either supplying labor for the production of the
primary good or becoming suppliers of the high-tech product, and workers
will become the latter only if they connect to a communications network. To
connect to the i-th provider’s network, each worker must pay a connection
fee, fi, in exchange for unlimited access up to the maximum throughput of
their particular connection. In other words, fi can be interpreted as the
price of the i-th provider’s services. A type-r worker chooses to connect to
the network for which
r + vyei − (fi + p) (1)
is the largest. This can be interpreted as follows: If r+vyei−fi ≥ p holds for a
particular worker, that worker pays the connection fee and starts to produce
the high-tech product. However, if r+vyei −fi < p holds, that worker chooses
not to connect to the network and produces the primary good instead. As
p rises, more workers choose not to connect to the network. Thus, one can
interpret (fi + p) as a connection fee including the outside option.
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In equilibrium, providers i and j will both have a positive number of
subscribers only if
(fi + p)− vyei = (fj + p)− vyej , (2)
where (fi + p) − vyei is the connection cost adjusted for network size.3 Let
Φ denote the common value of this cost. For a given value of Φ, only those
workers for whom r > Φ become producers of the network good. Given the
uniform distribution of r, there are L−Φ workers who choose to connect to
the networks. Thus, if the total number of network users is z, z = L − Φ
holds. Then, by substituting Φ = (fi + p) − vyei into this, we obtain the
condition for the connection fee:
fi = L− p + vyei − z. (3)
To simplify the analysis, I assume that the production cost for each
provider is equal to zero. Thus, the i-th provider’s proﬁts are
πi = xifi = xi(L− p + vyei − z). (4)
Each provider chooses its optimal number of subscribers by diﬀerentiating
eq. (4) with respect to xi.
3 (2) implies that in equilibrium all the existing networks necessarily provide the same
‘surplus,’ which is deﬁned as (1).
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Before turning to providers’ behavior, let us consider the equilibrium
supply level of the high-tech product. By Equations (1) and (3), a type-r
worker can produce r + z + f + p − L units of product. Furthermore, only
those workers for whom r is greater than L − z join the network, while the
others choose to produce the primary good. Integrating all workers who do
connect to the networks, we can obtain the total output of the high-tech
product:
S(z) =
∫ L
L−z
(ρ+ z + f + p− L)dρ = (z2/2) + (f + p)z. (5)
We can interpret this as the supply function of the high-tech product. This
function is represented by OS in Figure 1(b). As the total number of network
users becomes larger, the average productivity of each high-tech product sup-
plier rises: [S(z)/z]′ > 0. This is shown as lines OA and OA′ in Figure 1(b).
Each country thus has a supply function that exhibits increasing returns to
the size of the networks.
There are two sources of these gains: (1) as more workers join the net-
works and the total number of subscribers increases, each infra-marginal
worker can attain higher productivity through intensiﬁed network exter-
nalities; and (2) through these network externalities, each service provider
chooses to set a lower connection fee, which further attracts more workers.
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More noteworthy is that, in terms of income inequality between sectors, as
the size of the networks becomes larger, income inequality between sectors
increases.4
Depending on the interconnectivity between providers, several cases can
emerge as the production equilibrium. The following subsections discuss two
special cases: fully interconnected networks and unconnected networks.
2.1 The Case of Interconnected Networks
Let us assume that n providers are fully interconnected.5 A user who con-
nects to one network can communicate with users of other networks. Inter-
connectivity expands the size of each network to the total membership of all
providers. This raises the productivity gains enjoyed by a worker who sub-
scribes to only one provider’s network because network externalities depend
on the total size of the network (i.e., z = x1+ ...+xn). Equation (4) becomes
πi = xi(L− p+ vze − z).
4 Note that productivity in the primary good remains constant.
5 As space is limited, I concentrate on the nature of the equilibrium and pay scant at-
tention to the factors that determine interconnectivity. The case of endogenous formation
of interconnected networks will be discussed in Section 4.
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Maximizing this with respect to xi, we obtain
xi = L− p+ vze − z.
Imposing the requirement that in equilibrium workers’ expectations are ful-
ﬁlled (Fulﬁlled Expectation Equilibrium), ze = z = nx holds. Then we
obtain the equilibrium number of subscriber for each provider:
x = (L− p)/(n+ 1− nv). (6)
By summing Equation (6) over all providers, we obtain the total network
size as a function of the relative price of the high-tech product (1/p).
zI(1/p) = [n(L− p)]/(n+ 1− nv), zI′ > 0, (7)
where superscript I denotes the fulﬁlled expectations equilibrium value when
the networks are fully interconnected. The equilibrium is depicted in Figure
1(a). The horizontal axis shows the total size of the network, z, while the
vertical axis shows the values of L − p + vz and [(n + 1)z]/n. Equilibrium
is obtained at an intersection of two curves: line ON represents [(n+1)z]/n
while the other curve represents L− p+ vz. As p becomes smaller, the curve
will shift upward, which results in a larger total size of the network.
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2.2 The Case of Unconnected Networks
Next, let us consider the case in which n providers are not connected to
each other. Subscribers on one network cannot communicate with those on
the other networks. In this case, yi = xi holds. If there exists a symmetric
equilibrium, x = z/n holds. Thus, instead of (6), we obtain,
zU (1/p) = [n(L− p)]/[n+ 1− v], (8)
with superscript U denoting the equilibrium value of the unconnected net-
works. This case is represented by the dotted curve in Figure 1(a). Since
network externalities are smaller than in the case of interconnection, the equi-
librium total size of the network, zU , also becomes smaller than zI . With
these ﬁgures we obtain the supply curves of the high-tech product (Figure
2). The supply curve of the country with interconnected networks is located
to the right of the country with unconnectd networks.6
3 The Impact of Trade Integration
Suppose that the only diﬀerence between two countries is the interconnec-
tivity of the country-speciﬁc communications networks. Without loss of gen-
6 Note also that, since productivity rises as the relative price of the high-tech product
rises, the supply curves have concave shapes.
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erality, Home is assumed to have interconnected networks while Foreign has
unconnected networks. Also, let each country have the same demand function
for the high-tech product, D(1/p) (D′ < 0) which is shown as a downward
sloping curve in Figure 2.7 Note that zI > zU (S > S∗) holds.8 Let us
deﬁne the export supply functions of the high-tech product:
E(1/p) ≡ S[zI(1/p)]−D(1/p), (9)
E∗(1/p) ≡ S∗[zU (1/p)]−D(1/p). (10)
Autarky equilibrium requires that E = E∗ = 0. Thus, from (9) and (10),
Home has the lower autarky price for the high-tech product (i.e., (1/p) <
(1/p∗)).
Now suppose that Home and Foreign open their goods markets and have
a trading relationship. The opening of trade provides an opportunity for
entry into Home’s high-tech product sector because, with the expanded net-
work size, the average productivity of Home workers is much higher than
that of Foreign workers. Furthermore, as trade opens and (1/p) rises, more
Home workers choose to subscribe to the networks. From their viewpoint,
7 Note that we assume away any income eﬀect.
8 In what follows, ∗ denotes variables for Foreign.
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producing the primary good becomes less attractive.9 At the same time, as
(1/p∗) falls, producing the high-tech product becomes less attractive in For-
eign. Thus, the scale of Home (interconnected) networks will expand while
Foreign (unconnected) networks will contract. The diﬀerences in the network
sizes will be reinforced by this entry-exit process. In Home, additional en-
try of new workers enhances exports of the high-tech product: E ′(1/p) > 0.
Through these mechanisms, the circular relationship between network ex-
pansion and trade creation continues. That is, there will be a cumulative
process in which the opportunity for trade (i.e., an increase in price) brings
about the opportunity for larger networks, and the increased sizes of the
networks promote (through intensiﬁed network externalities) exports. This
process will continue until the price diﬀerential between countries disappears.
From (9) and (10), the trading equilibrium price (1/pT ) is determined by the
following condition:
E(1/pT )−E∗(1/pT ) = 0. (11)
Proposition 1: A comparative advantage in the high-tech product is held by
a country with interconnected networks. If the two countries commence free
trade from autarky, the country with interconnected networks incompletely
9 Note that r + vz − f = p holds for the marginal worker.
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specializes in the high-tech product and the country with unconnected networks
incompletely specializes in the primary good.
Note the impact of trade on income inequality between sectors within
each country. Since productivity in the primary-good sector remains con-
stant (i.e., one unit of labor produces one unit of the primary good), we
only have to concentrate on the productivity in the high-tech product sector.
As I have shown in the previous section, the size of the networks positively
aﬀects productivity. Since (1/p) < (1/pT ) < (1/p∗) holds, the size of the
Home network expands (z(1/pT ) > z(1/p)) while the Foreign one contracts
(z∗(1/pT ) < z∗(1/p∗)). This change raises the Home high-tech sector’s pro-
ductivity, so we can say that Home’s income inequality between sectors be-
comes greater with the opening of trade. Similarly, we can say that Foreign’s
income inequality between sectors becomes smaller as the result of trade.
Proposition 2: International trade increases inequality in the country that
exports the high-tech product and reduces inequality in the country that ex-
ports the primary good.
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4 Discussion
In this section I describe two directions in which the model could be ex-
tended. First, rather than trade between a country with fully interconnected
networks and a country with unconnected networks, consider trade between
two countries in which the networks are partially interconnected. Analyses in
previous subsections reveal that the total size of the network under autarky
determines comparative advantage. For illustrative purposes, assume that
Foreign networks remain unconnected. Even if only Provider 1 and Provider
2 in Home are fully interconnected (i.e., y1 = y2 = x1+x2) and the remaining
n − 2 providers are unconnected, the size of Home’s network is larger than
that of Foreign’s due to intensiﬁed network externalities between Provider 1
and Provider 2. As in the previous section, Home becomes a net exporter of
the high-tech product. Since there are various types of partial interconnec-
tion, formal modeling of trade under partially connected networks is beyond
the scope of this note. Thus, there is room for further investigation.
Secondly, let us consider the endogenous formation of interconnected
networks.10 In analyzing this I will look at each provider’s change in proﬁts,
∆π ≡ πI − πU ,
10 I would like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this.
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where πI (πU) represents each provider’s proﬁts in the case of interconnected
(unconnected) networks. Also, I assume that there is a ﬁxed cost for inter-
connection, f , which each provider must pay before interconnection. Substi-
tuting equilibrium output levels into the proﬁt function (4), we can calcu-
late each provider’s equilibrium proﬁts as πI = (L− p)2/(n+ 1− nv)2 and
πU = (L− p)2/(n + 1− v)2. Thus, the change in proﬁts becomes:
∆π = (L− p)2[(n + 1− nv)−2 − (n + 1− v)−2] > 0.
Note that both the population size (L) and the magnitude of network exter-
nalities (v) positively aﬀect this change, while the number of providers (n)
negatively aﬀect it. Incentives for interconnection depend on the relationship
between ∆π and f . If ∆π > f holds, each provider chooses to connect and
interconnected networks emerge. If ∆π < f holds, however, networks re-
main unconnected. This result has important policy implications. Through
subsidization of the ﬁxed cost of interconnection, one country may acquire
a comparative advantage in high-tech products.11 Further research should
focus on these policy implications.
11 Furthermore, a natural extension would consider international policies to coordinate
the subsidization of interconnected networks. The beneﬁt of such policies are debatable.
17
5 Concluding Remarks
This study highlights the role of network externalities as a driving force
behind trade in knowledge-based, high-tech products. It should be empha-
sized that diﬀerences in connectivity among country-speciﬁc communications
networks determine the comparative advantages of countries. When two
countries are endowed with equal amounts of labor, the country with con-
nected networks can attain higher productivity with its superior information-
handling capabilities. This outcome diﬀers from results obtained from trade
models with increasing returns and imperfect competition. In those models,
a country with either a larger factor endowment or a larger domestic market
acquires a comparative advantage in the good that is produced under increas-
ing returns to scale technology.12 The present model suggests, however, that
even a smaller country can acquire a comparative advantage in a high-tech
product via the utilization of interconnected networks. What really matters
is interconnectivity rather than country size. More noteworthy is that there
is a circular process between network expansion and trade creation which
further aﬀects income inequality within each country.
Although these results are derived under the assumption that communica-
12 See, for example, Helpman and Krugman (1985, Chs. 3 and 10).
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tions networks are purely country-speciﬁc, it appears that something similar
to this will occur in more general settings. The present analysis must be
regarded as very tentative. Hopefully, it provides a useful paradigm for the
consideration of how communications infrastructure works as a driving force
for international trade.
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